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The adopting of the Compliance Program in Italian 
groups quoted at Italian Stock Exchange 
 
Simona Alfiero* and Silvana Secinaro** 
 
This paper proposes a framework for the analysis of the systems 
of governance, with the aim of highlighting similarities/differences 
and models of best practices to tend towards in the choices of 
governance adopted by the corporate groups, with particular 
attention to the implementation of the compliance program, 
introduced in Italy by the organisational model provided for by 
Legislative Decree 231/01, and the influences that the same may 
have on the regulation of infragroup relations. 
 
Field of Research: Auditing, Internal Auditing, Compliance Program, Governance, 
Infragroup Relations. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper proposes a framework for the analysis of the systems of 
governance, with the aim of highlighting similarities/differences and models of 
best practices to tend towards in the choices of governance adopted by the 
corporate groups, with particular attention to the implementation of the 
compliance program, introduced in Italy by the organisational model provided 
for by Legislative Decree 231/01, and the influences that the same may have 
on the regulation of infragroup relations. The Legislative Decree 231/2001 
has introduced the culture of internal checks in companies as a prevention of 
offences, into Italy. The regulation imposes sanctions on companies as legal 
entities responsible for not having prevented its employees from committing 
offences in the interests of the company (offences against the public 
administration, IT offences, offences against safety in the work place, false 
declarations in the financial statements etc.). The organisational model 
inspired by legislative decree 231/2001 in providing for the administrative 
accountability of legal entities is founded on an entity considered individually 
and makes no provision in the legislation for groups of companies. 
 
A significant shortcoming if one considers the growing role of company 
groupings and the impact their activity has not just on domestic markets, but, 
in general, on the entire economic, social and environmental scenario in 
which they operate. It is therefore the job of the interpreter to rebuild the 
legislative statute as to the administrative accountability of a company 
belonging to a group of companies, determining the assumptions, limits and 
guarantees and therefore to determine suitable management and checking 
organisational models that govern infragroup relations, in the light of the new 
legislation laid down. 
*Dr Simona Alfiero, Phd in Business Administration, University of Turin – Faculty of 
Economics - Department of Business Administration -, Corso Unione Sovietica 218 bis, 
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2. Literature review 
 
The role attributed to corporate governance in recent decades has undergone 
significant evolution that is effectively summed up in the following definitions: 
[Governance is] “the process of supervision and control intended to ensure 
that the company’s management acts in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders” (“Cadbury Report. The Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance”, Financial Reporting Council, United Kingdon, 1992); “the 
governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the 
company per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with 
overseeing and controlling, the executive actions of management and with 
satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation by interests 
beyond the corporate boundaries” (Tricker 1984). 
 
Subsequently, with specific reference to the last ten years, the theme of 
corporate governance has been the subject of great interest by management 
studies and a great deal of research on the characteristics of boards of 
directors (Daily, Dalton e Cannella, 2003) and of the control bodies and the 
ways in which they function. The companies that can be identified in one 
group, i.e. linked by a single economic subject are influenced by the action of 
the economic subject that uses instruments directed at the organisational 
units. 
 
The group member carries out an action with respect to the other members of 
the group which is variable due to the distance from the local organs set up 
for management purposes, the instruments employed in the exercising power 
of an economic nature as well as for the intensity and the direction of the 
influence exercised, with regard to the particular objectives to be pursued. 
 
On the other hand, if we consider the better known “four dimensions of 
integration”, that summarise the motivational aspects correlated with the 
existence of a group, i.e. reciprocity, opportunism, expectations and faith, we 
notice that the sharing of the risk, the exchange of technologies, the 
rationalisation within the group have common bases of understanding for the 
development of the group itself (reciprocity). 
 
From another point of view, however, opportunism, according to which each 
subject tends to favour his own interests, it can create serious prejudices at 
the level of group co-ordination and expectations each entity places in the 
group and mutual trust. Opportunistic behaviour, regardless of the way in 
which it manifests itself, produces important consequences: it could induce 
the increase in the cost of a transaction between the companies with the risk 
of compromising any economy-of-scale-related benefits. The consequence is 
the increase in the costs of control since the companies are obliged to 
dedicate more energy to the monitoring of other people’s conduct. 
 
Furthermore the opportunism increases the risk of conflict while reducing the 
co-ordination of the group. 
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3. Methodology of the Research 
 
The research is based on the empirical analysis of Italian groups quoted at 
the Italian Stock Exchange. The sample consisted of 282 holding companies. 
The companies belonging to the following areas: 
 
 
 
The analysis is developed, through the tracing and study of all the 
documentation concerning the organisational models of the groups taken as 
part of the sample and the relative subsidiaries: in particular the consolidated 
financial statements of the group and the financial year of the relative 
subsidiaries, the reports about corporate governance, the organisational 
models in 231/01 and the codes of ethics. 
 
The study of the abovementioned documentation has made it possible, partly 
through a deep analysis of the scientific contributions present on the subject, 
to develop a questionnaire/interview to submit to the parties who act as 
contacts on the board of directors of the groups sampled normally identified in 
the Internal Audit function. 
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The questionnaire aims at identifying and highlighting the governance-related 
decisions adopted by the groups of companies with particular attention to the 
organisational model provided for in legislative decree 231/01 and the 
influences the same may have on the regulation of infragroup relations with 
regard to administrative accountability. 
 
The questionnaire is organised into three sections: 
a. general information about the company ; 
b. corporate governance model; 
c. model of organisation, management and control pursuant to legislative 
decree n. 231/2001. 
In particular the third section is structured into ten questions most of them 
closed: 
1) Does the parent company adopt the organisational model pursuant to 
legislative decree 231/2001? 
2) Do all the companies in the group adopt the organisational model pursuant 
to legislative decree 231/2001? If not how many of them do not adopt it? 
3) Does the organisational model pursuant to legislative decree 231/2001 
provided for the regulation of intergroup relations? 
4) If so, in what way? 
5) Are the group’s information systems uniform? 
6) Is the same access to the group’s information technology available to all 
and any of the group’s companies? Who is the party who regulates the 
operating procedures and the mechanisms of the group? 
7) What are the infragroup control procedures? 
8) Have you highlighted limitations and gaps in the organisational model 
pursuant to legislative decree 231/2001? 
9) Has it been possible to highlight influences on the economic and financial 
situation of the individual company or the group following the implementation 
of the organisational model pursuant to legislative decree 231/2001? 
10) If so, in what way? 
 
From the questionnaire, it emerged that 71% of the companies belonging to 
the single groups examined adopt the organisational model 231.To the 
question regarding the possibility of regulating infragroup relations through 
the organisational model pursuant to legislative decree 231/2001 the answers 
were all the same: there are no clear and explicit references to infragroup 
relations in the models adopted; in most of the cases, only the indication is 
given of the guidelines, very incomplete about the role the supervisory body 
should play with regard to the monitoring of a number of processes called 
sensitive and that involve more than one company in the group. 
 
The reference sample, in 92% of cases, said it had homogenous information 
technology systems and certainly highlights the advantages, in economic and 
financial terms, in the adoption of the organisational model even if it is difficult 
to see. 
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4. Discussion 
 
What if the company, part of a group of companies is responsible for a 
offence such as to involve the whole group? What are the protections of the 
group before the offences committed by the individual companies? Is the 
model pursuant to law 231/01 adopted by the single subsidiaries enough to 
protect the group? 
 
There are offences for which the error of the individual involves the group. As 
an example it is sufficient to consider the offence of false declarations in the 
financial statements: if this is committed by a company in the group it follows 
that the reflections on the consolidated financial statements of the group are 
devastating. 
 
Who answers for it? In what way should the group be protected and the real 
culprits shown up? 
 
It is a complex mechanism of protection that must be identified in the interests 
of the all the group’s stakeholders. It can help the process of risk 
management and risk assessment, that must be based therefore on : 
 
• identifying the risks of the group in relation to the offences of the 
subsidiaries that might be committed; 
• in designing a preventative system of checking by the parent company, 
implemented through the construction of an adequate organisation system 
and the setting up of procedures for certain activities; 
• in the adoption of a group code of ethics and a system of disciplinary 
sanctions that can be applied in the case that the measures provided for by 
the model are not complied with for the purpose of maintaining its 
effectiveness; 
• in the identification of the criteria for choosing an internal control 
organisation equipped with the necessary functions that shall supervise the 
efficiency, the adequacy and the application of compliance with the model. 
For the purposes of creating a risk management system, the aim is to divide 
the activities that pose a risk of offence for the group up into a series of 
procedures in order to prevent it being committed. 
To activate a risk management system the company must therefore: 
• map the company areas at risk 
• determine the potential methods by which offenders can operate , in the 
areas specified above 
• describe the system of controls activated and the adaptations for enhanced 
operation necessary. 
In particular, it should be monitored the elements showing the involvement of 
the group can be broken down as follows: 
- the systematic nature with which the people at the top of the company have 
had recourse to the instrument of corruption to win public contracts; 
- the capacity of companies to create large availability of slush funds 
indispensible for being able to pay bribes to public functionaries able to 
influence the awarding of contract; 
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- the illegal management of the accounts of group companies with frequent 
and unjustified movement of capital between the various companies; 
- the full agreement with the use of corruption by the reference shareholder; 
- the serious, concrete and current danger of commissioning illicit acts of the 
same type as those for which proceedings are instituted. 
The determination of the activities in the context of which offences might be 
committed presupposes an in-depth analysis of the company situation with 
the aim of establishing the areas that are involved in the potential cases of 
offence. It is just as necessary to have an analysis of the possible ways of 
carrying out the said offences. 
 
In these cases, this analysis must lead to an exhaustive representation of 
how offences can be committed with regard to the internal and external 
operating environment in which the company operates. In this analysis it will 
be necessary to take into account the history of the company – that is to say 
its past vicissitudes, even of a legal nature – and of the characteristics of the 
entities working in the same sector. 
 
The study of the company’s history and the corporate reality is essential for 
being able to determine offences that are easier to commit in the context of 
the company and the way they are committed. It is possible to establish – on 
the basis of historical data – at which moment in the life and operations of the 
company risk factors are more likely to arise; what therefore are the moments 
in the life of the company that must more specifically be parcelled up and 
subject to procedures in order to be adequately and efficiently checked: for 
example the moment of the presentation of bids for the companies who take 
part in public appeals; the contacts with the competition; the methods of 
carrying out the contracts; the analysis of the attributes of external 
consultants (particularly concerning the their cost and effectiveness), the 
management of economic resources, the movements of money inside the 
group etc. 
 
The guidelines developed by a number of associations representing 
companies suggest the separation of tasks between those who carry out 
crucial phases in the context of a process at risk, the attribution of authorising 
signatory powers and powers of signature coherent with the organisational 
and management responsibilities, the existence of a monitoring system that 
can indicate critical situations. It is also suggested in the specific sector of 
relations with the public administration, that a manager be appointed inside 
the company for each individual operation that falls into areas of risk, with the 
obligation to produce specific documentation for the activities carried out; the 
adoption of further internal control thresholds when being a member of a 
consortium or a temporary association of companies, the adoption of 
instruments aimed at checking the existence, not merely accounting, of the 
services carried out by consultants, the adoption of instruments and 
mechanisms that make the management of the financial resources 
transparent and that , in synthesis, prevent the creation – through the issue of 
invoices for nonexistent operations, through unjustified movements of money 
between companies belonging to the same group, through payments for 
consultancy never actually supplied or if supplied, supplied at a value far 
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below that declared by the company – hidden availability of cash. It is, in fact, 
evident that the committing of a wide variety of those offences that the 
compliance programs should try to impede presupposes the company’s 
availability money that does not emerge from the official accounting and that 
therefore can be spent without any form of control. 
 
The need for a group organisational model that clearly regulates the 
infragroup relations is clearly greater the faster the rate at which the risk is 
growing of offences being committed. 
 
But how must the risk be determined? Are there elements that can determine 
the level of criminal-administrative risk to which a group is subject? 
 
To answer the questions referred to above, a set of variables must be taken 
into account that have a greater and an objective impact on the penal and 
administrative risk of the group: 
- the number of subsidiaries in the group: the greater the number of 
subsidiaries in the group the greater the need for supervision of the infragroup 
actions; 
- life cycle of the group: it is necessary to identify the phase of development in 
which the group finds itself, reconstructing the group’s history 
- analysis of the sector the group is part of: it is advisable to analyse the 
number of penal and administrative offences committed by the companies in 
the sector and compare them with the number of companies in the sector (the 
result can be called a judicial rating of the sector); 
- the number of criminal – administrative priors the companies in the group 
have placing them in proportion to the number of companies in the group 
(judicial rating of the group). 
The analysis of the four variables, that can be compared on the matrix leads 
to the determination of the group’s degree of litigiousness and consequently 
the level of risk of being involved in administrative-penal offences pursuant to 
law 231/2001. 
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From the analysis effected it has emerged that the sectors characterised by 
the greatest litigiousness are the finance, consumer goods and 
communications. The graph below comes out of the combination of the four 
variables observed and suitably weighed for each group that give rise to the 
establishment of risk classes that can be cross-checked with three levels of 
the probability of their being implemented. 
 
The x-axis shows the seven classes of risk that can be seen within the group, 
while the y axis shows for the purposes of better positioning inside the class 
itself three levels of riskiness relative to the probability of the potential risk 
occurring. 
 
With the increase in the level of the likelihood of risk occurring (from level 1 to 
level 3) and the shift onto classes of risk positioned to the right of the origin 
(from minimum under strict observation) the risk that can be configured as a 
potential offence inside the group will be more intense. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The research confirm the need to adopt specific techniques and instruments 
that are suitable for identifying and analysing all risks that could concern the 
group of companies. It emerges in fact that Italian companies invest in 
systems to monitor performance and compliance, trying an integrated 
approach at group level. The objective is in fact the transversal and 
exhaustive nature of risk evaluation that leads to models of group 
organisation that are efficient and effective. 
 
Efficient, in such a way that the costs of managing the system are less than 
the benefits obtained in terms of risk coverage; effective in as much the 
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organisational models integrated at group level increase the protection of the 
administrative and criminal accountability ofthe entire company group. 
An unitary organisational model thus involves an integrated internal auditing 
system that must be well established inside the group of companies. 
 
Furthermore, it becomes necessary for the group will have to entrust itself to 
an autonomous body of the company, imbued with its own powers of initiative 
and checking, the task of supervising the functioning and observing of the 
model and ensure it is updated. With regard to this control organism this body 
may not be identified within the Board of Directors or group of directors 
without proxies; the solution proposed is that of entrusting such a task to the 
Internal Auditing function of the parent company. In companies of medium to 
large scale quoted or otherwise, the institution of this function that is an 
independent and objective activity of “assurance” and consultancy aimed at 
the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation. 
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